Rules of the Brussels Club, September 11th 2010 P52 N1P89 EU加盟国に対す る統制不備
This means that, oddly, it is harder to influence insiders than outsiders. The EU has great power to transform the internal workings of countries seeking membership. The so-called Copenhagen criteria demand of candidates that they have functioning market economies and institutions that can guarantee democracy, the rule of law and protection of minorities. But once countries join, the EU's means of enforcing such requirements are comparatively weak. This is something of a paradox, given how deeply the EU permeats the lives of its citizens. This week, for instance, the EU extended its reach by establishing Euro-wide bodies to regulate banks and other financial institutions.
In fact a big stick is rarely needed. Where members have chosen to pool their sovereignty, such as on competition. The EU polices mostly by consent, like the British bobby who patrols unarmed. Wayward members can usually be brought into line by public exposure and the odd lawsuit. Where states remain sovereign, they guard their prerogatives and the EU must stay out.
But on at least two issues, such genteel methods are proving inadequate. One is the deportation of Roma from France. The European Commission plainly disapproves： its president, Jose Manuel Barros, said this week that states should not ゛reawaken the ghosts of Europe's past゛(although he declined to name France). Surely, mutter diplomats, any country seeking to join the EU that had ejected Roma as noisily as France has would have its application held up. One asks：゛If the Copenhagen criteria were applied to EU members, how many would pass the grade?゛
The other question defying EU enforce is the euro. The Greek crisis cruelly exposed the EU's inability to police the budget-deficit limits imposed by the stability and growth pact, which is meant to underpin the single currency. Now the EU is looking for more credible punishments against rule-breakers.
Germany is toughest, suggesting that offenders' voting rights should be suspended. But this would require a formal treaty change, which few are willing to consider after the long travail over Lisbon. Others suggest financial penalties, such as holding back cohesion and structual funds, even support for farming and fisheries. But this runs into several objections： taking money away from a country that is critically short of funds would exacerbate a crisis； and withholding money from poor countries could undermine the EU's political cohesion. Countries are already seeking exceptions； France, for instance, says cutting farm subsidies would be illegal. In fact, the stability and growth pact does provide an option for financial penalties to be imposed on rule-breakers, but they have never been used.
